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INDIAN TAXATION, TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DANIEL H. ISRAEL*
THOMAS L. SMITHSON**

INTRODUCTION
The development of Indian law has not been the result of planned
and deliberate consolidation and expansion of tribal power by sovereign entities. Rather, the evolution of Indian law has been characterized by crisis-oriented responses and improvised defenses to
attacks on tribal sovereignty and authority by external interest
groups. An arrest for exercising traditional hunting or fishing
rights, a bill to extend jurisdiction in the state for Indian reservations, the construction of a power plant or dam or oil pipeline,
and any other action taken by Congress, a state, or third parties
may propel Indian nations and Indian lawyers into a multitude
of defensive positions with the necessity for immediate response
debilitating the development of a concise and defined legal framework. As a result legal priorities for Indians and for lawyers serving
them are shaped by external pressure rather than internal planning.
Currently the most significant threat facing the Indian nations
concerns the question of state taxation.'
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Commission, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
et al., and Tonasket v. Washington may be rendered at any time.
This article was prepared originally as a working paper for a
seminar on the same subject at the 50th Annual National Legal
* Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund. A.B., Amherst College (1963) ; M.A.,
University of Pennsylvania (1964); J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1967).
Member of the bars of New York and Colorado.
** Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund. A.B., University of
Michigan (1965)
J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1968). Member of the bars of Michigan and
South Dakota.
1. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 432 F.2d 956 (1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3512 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1971) ; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 14 Ariz. App. 452,
484 P.2d 221 (1971), prob. jursr. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 8542 (U.S. May 15, 1972) ; Tonasket
v. Washington, 79 Wash. 2d-607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971), prob. juris. noted, 40' U.S.L.W. 3588
(U.S. June 12, 1972); Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n. -Ariz.-,
490 P.2d 846
(1971). appeal docketed, No. 71-1263, 406 U.S. 943 (1972).
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Aid and Defenders Association conference held in Miami, Florida, November 9-11, 1972. That working paper was prepared by the authors
under the auspices of the Native American Rights Fund on the basis
of amicus curiae briefs prepared by them and staff attorney L.
Graeme Bell, III, and filed in the United States Supreme Court
in the pending tax cases in June and July, 1972. This article opens
with a discussion of suggested theories for use in resisting state
taxation, followed by an analysis of the effect of Public Law 280
on state taxing powers and concludes with an argument in favor
of expanded Indian taxation of business enterprises on Indian reservations.
Recent developments in the area of state taxation of Indians
have been precipitated in part by aggressive state legislatures'a and
revenue departments seeking to expand badly needed revenue sources
through termination of Indian immunities. In a very significant
sense, the observation of the United States Supreme Court that
"because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where
[Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies," is as
timely today as it was in 1886.2 The several states with substantial
Indian populations continue to deal with reservations within their
territory as if each Indian tribe was a mere municipalilty possessing
certain inexplicable and anomalous immunities from state taxation.
The conduct of many states toward Indian nations within their
boundaries is disrespectful and degrading to the status of the tribe
as a domestic dependent nation and to the Indian people as a separate people with a proud culture, proud traditions and plans for
their own development. The states, whether out of mere lust for
power, or whether as agents for ranchers, farmers, power companies, residential developers and other private moneyed-interests,
ignore federal policy and separate Indian identifications and attempt
to treat Indians as fungible parts of their general citizenry.
I.

RESISTING STATE TAXATION OF INDIANS
ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

On those occasions when the federal judiciary has protected
Indian tribes and tribal property from state taxation, state taxing
l.a Attorneys for the Navajo and Uapago Tribal Utility Authorities have opposed the

Imposition of a tax on the wholesale sale of power to the tribal authorities. In the Matter of
the Protest of Arizona Public Service Company, Arizona State Tax Commission, Amicus
Brief of Navajo Tribal Utility Authority filed February, 1973. The Arizona Legislature
was surprisingly candid in enacting the tax:
The purpose of this legislation is to tax wholesale sales of power which
escape taxation because of certain exempt status. Arizona Laws, 1972, Chapter 93, Section 1, Effective August 13, 1972. See Anxz. R v. STAT. AwN. §
42-1210, 2(b) (1972 Supp.).
2.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
o
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officials have sought either to avoid the federal rulings or to relitigate the issues in case after case over the years. Frequently,
this course of action takes advantage of the individual Indian's lack
of knowledge as to his immunity from state taxation. The situation
in South Dakota provides a particularly vivid example. In United
States v. Rickert,3 the Supreme Court decided that the State of
South Dakota could not impose personal property taxes on cattle and
ranching implements when used on the reservation by reservation
Indians. Notwithstanding this decision, the State of South Dakota
consistently sought to tax Indian-owned cattle, hoping in each case
to prove that the Indian could not trace the origin of his herd
to "Sioux Benefits" or to other property put into the Indian's
hands by the United States. The State sought thereby to establish
that any commingling of separate funds (gained by the Indian in
ways other than obtaining the property directly from the government of the United States) broke the instrumentality chain and
deprived the Indian property of its tax-exempt status. At one trial,
counsel for a Board of County Commissioners went so far as to
inquire whether a white man's bulls were used to inseminate the
Indian rancher's cows. While the state had, in fact, no power
to tax the personal property of the Indians in Indian country,
persistent attempts were made to tax unknowing Indians, and thereby, to reduce the revenue base of the tribe. The Oglala Sioux
Tribe, for example, enacted a personal property tax of a $1.50
per head on cattle owned within its jurisdiction. 4 In 1968 the
South Dakota Supreme Court decided the case of Pourier v. Board
of County Commissioners of Shannon County,5 articulating two
independent bases for immunity of Indian personal property from
the tax. The two bases were the government instrumentality theory
set forth in Rickert, and secondly, the jurisdictional inability of
South Dakota taxing power to reach personal property owned and
used by Indians within Indian country.6
Notwithstanding the decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court
in Pourier, County Commissioners of Fall River County, sitting
for the unorganized county of Shannon on the Pine Ridge Reservation, continued to tax all Indian cows and require the Indians,
on a case by case basis, to establish their "exemption"
from
3. United States v. Rlckert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
4. Tribal taxation of non-Indans was sustained in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Barta, 146
F. Supp. 917 (D.S.D. 1956); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.
1956).
5. Pourier v. Board of County Commissioners of Shannon County, 157 N.W.2d 532
(S.D. 1968).
6. Judge Grieves of the 10th Judicial Circuit had decided in 1965 that Indian-owned
cattle could not be taxed by the state, following the Instrumentality or government purpose theory set forth in Rickert. See Colombe v. Todd County, S.C. Cir. Ct., Grieves, N.J.
Feb. 27, 1965.
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the state tax. Recently, the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial
Circuit decided in the cases of Board of County Commissioners of
Shannon County v. Montileaux, Bissonette, Wilson and Sauser,
memorandum opinions, August 18, 1972, that the state has no power
whatever to enforce its personal property taxes against Indian property on the reservation. The crowning blow in the development of
this story of taxation in South Dakota is the fact that in the Bissonette case, the court, while ruling that the state -had no power to tax
within the reservation, (the court did not hold that the animals
were merely exempt from an otherwise valid state tax) nevertheless
ruled that a state statute of limitations on application for refunds
barred Bissonette from recovering $250,0 in taxes which he paid
under the threat of having deeded land which he owned on the
reservation sold at a tax sale.
Attempted imposition of state taxes on reservation Indians must
not be viewed simply as a good-natured dispute between adjacent
governments over the rightful power to tax or the allocation of
taxing jurisdiction. Attempted assertions of state taxing power and
state regulatory power are necessarily aimed at the involuntary
assimilation of tribal Indians into the "dominant" culture on terms
and at a rate which can only be detrimental to them. Certainly
no Indian who chooses to enter non-Indian society with its materialistic competition should be denied full opportunity on the level
of all citizens. The attitude of a state trying to assimilate Indians
who wish to maintain a separate enclave, however, is as condescending and arrogant as that of an anthropologist, who, for his
own purposes, wishes to preserve as museum pieces, tribes who
do wish to assimilate. It must be made clear that non-Indians,
be they state governments, ranchers, oil companies, real estate
developers, or county assessors, have no right to make decisions
for individual Indians or for tribes.
From the foregoing comments, it is suggested that an analysis
of state taxation of Indians should proceed from the assumption
that most Indians are unalterably opposed to the extension of state
power in Indian country, and that it does not lie within the province
of any non-Indian, lawyer or not, to compromise the Indian immunity from taxation and other assertions of state power. Accordingly, as a preliminary matter, it is not appropriate to engage in
economic analysis-of the incidences and theoretical economic justifications of the various taxes imposed by various states. Consistent
with the national goals of Indian tribes it must be argued that no
state-imposed tax on Indian business activities, Indian property, or
Indian income within Indian country is valid without the explicit
consent of Congress. This position is fully consistent with the case
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law decided to date; it is not necessary to construct novel legal
theories in order to maintain the national immunity of Indians and
their property from taxation by any state or subdivision.
There have been, on occasion, Acts of Congress granting specific
states the power to tax certain kinds of tribal property.7 In the
absence of such a statuie, the only conceivable argument for the
ability of states to tax Indians would be the existence of a general
grant of power to the states to apply all of their laws in Indian
country. No such statutes have ever been enacted.8 Thus, state
assertion of tax powers has traditionally been resisted by asserting
that the existence of sovereign, self-governing tribes, exercising
the full range of powers which the United States Supreme Court
recognized as powers possessed by the Cherokee Nation in Worcester
v. Georgia,9 creates an impassable jurisdictional barrier. In Worcester, the Supreme Court recognized that the Cherokee Nation
was a "domestic dependent nation" and a "distinct political community" in which the laws of the state of Georgia can have no
force and effect. 10 Today however, states are increasingly taking
the position that the developments in law have taken so great
a toll of attrition upon tribal sovereignty that states may enact
and enforce whatever taxes they choose except taxes directly imposed on trust or restricted real or personal property.
The primary opposition to state taxation of Indians must be
the objection based on a lack of state jurisdiction. Jurisdictional
restraints on state assertion of taxing power should be most aggressively pursued: Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations"
and "distinct political communities in which the laws of the [statesi
... can have no force."1 1 Simply put, it must be asserted
that tribes are vested with all governmental power 12 and as a
matter of tribal will and federal policy, continue to possess all
governmental power not taken from them by the Congress in the
exercise of its plenary power in the field of Indian affairs."s From
this beginning, conclusions consistent with self-determination follow
logically. Affirmative congressional legislation in derogation of tribal
power must be specifically enacted, in order for it to be concluded
7.

See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 398(c) (1970).

R. See discussion, relating to the Impact of Public Law 280 on the power of states to

Impose state taxes, infra. where It is argued that Public Law 280 does not confer on the
states the power to Impose comprehensive state taxation.
9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515 (1932).
10.

Id.

at 560.

11. Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, _
F. Supp._,
Civil
No. 1972-152 (W.D.N.Y. August 9, 1972); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 8P
(8th Cir. 1956) ; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).

12. Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, _
_
Supp.-,
Civil
No. 1972-152 (W.D.N.Y. August 9, 1972); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89
(8th Cir. 1956) ; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).

13.

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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that a tribe has been stripped of, or has otherwise relinquished,
its authority. Similarly, it must be presumed that all state laws
can have no force or affect in Indian country unless Congress
has explicitly permitted the state to apply its laws in Indian country.
This argument appears to be the only approach to Indian taxation
problems which is consistent with the law as it has developed,
with economy in the use of judicial time, and with the sovereignty,
dignity, and self-determination of Indian nations. Moreover, the
validity of the jurisdictional argument for Indian immunity from
state taxation has been recognized by Felix Cohen, the leading
authority on Indian law.
To the extent that Indians and Indian property within an Indian reservation are not subject to state laws, they are not
subject to state tax laws.
We have seen elsewhere, that state laws, are not applicable
to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that state laws shall apply. It
follows that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to state taxation except by virtue
of express authority conferred upon the state by act of Congress. 14
This argument begins, of course, with the landmark case of
Worcester v. Georgia. Since that case, there has been no case
in the United States Supreme Court holding that states may apply
their tax laws to Indians on reservations. 5 In only a few instances 6
has the Congress explicitly permitted states to tax Indians and
their property on reservations.
Since there is no Act of Congress which explicitly confers general taxing jurisdiction, we turn for guidance to Public Law 83-280,
67 Stat. 588, as amended by Public Law 90-284,17 which conferred
on certain named states civil and criminal jurisdiction over selected
Indian reservations. At this point we look at Public Law 280 not
to determine whether it provides either a Congressional grant of
exemption to Indians from state taxation or a congressional conferral
on the states of power which could sustain the assertion of state
taxation over Indians,18 but rather as a tool for analysis in helping
us to determine just what taxing power states would have in the
14. F. S. COEN, HIADBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 254 (reprint 1942).
15. Cases have been decided applying state taxes to restricted and trust lands not on
reservations. See West v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n., 334 U.S. 717 (1948); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n. v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943). These cases have been criticized. Mason
v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364 (1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Jan. 16,
1973).
16. E.g., 25 U.S.C. 398(c) (1970).
17. Pub. L. No. 90-284 repealed § 7 of Pub. L. No. 280 and added an Indian consent
requirement See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1326 (1970).
18. See text, Section IV infra.
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absence of a specific statute authorizing taxation. For this reason,
it is important that we look at Public Law 280, not only for those
states which have had state jurisdiction imposed or permitted through
its terms, but also with reference to states which have not assumed
jurisdiction under Public Law 280. It has been held that Public
Law 280 did not grant additional exemptions from taxation but
rather merely restated the law as it existed prior to the time
Public Law 280 was enacted. 19 If this is the case, then, Public
Law 280 did not purport to render trust or restricted real or personal
property taxable if it was not previously taxable, nor to extend
to it immunity if it was previously taxable. It goes without saying
that the tax status of property, persons, and transactions in states
not acting under Public Law 280 is not affected thereby. At the
outset of this analysis, it is important to note that had Public
Law 280 been enacted in a state, the state would have acquired,
in addition to the power of exercising criminal and civil "cause of
action" jurisdiction over Indian country, the power to apply some
of its laws of general application to Indian persons and property
in Indian country. Nowhere else, save in a few explicit acts dealing
with individual reservations or specific kinds of property, do we find
any permission to any state to apply its laws. 2° In short, the
full force and effect which Worcester v. Georgia denied to state
laws must be held to be still inapplicable in Indian country, unless
Public Law 280 is the vehicle with which the state applies its laws.
It is difficult to see how a state can argue (in the face of Public
Law 280 and its failure to take action to assume jurisdiction and
to apply its law as provided by that law) that it has residual or
general jurisdiction on the theory that Congress has not prohibited
it from exercising such jurisdiction.
Because states insist that they have the right to apply their
tax laws to reservation Indians, it becomes necessary to analyze
Public Law 280 in the context of Williams v. Lee.2 1 The states take
the position that they may apply any state laws which do not infringe upon tribal self-government. They argue that the tax on in'come or business activity of an individual member can have no
impact on tribal self-government as a whole, and that therefore
the exercise of state jurisdiction is acceptable notwithstanding their
failure to act under Public Law 280. The reasoning of the state is
erroneous in at least two respects. First of all, one reaches the
question of whether a particular state action interferes with tribal
self-government only after one searches for an explicit Act of Con19.
20.
21.

Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863 (1957).
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 231, 398(c) (1927).
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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gress which authorizes the particular application of state law for
which the state contends.2 1 a In the case of assumption of jurisdiction
over civil and criminal causes of action, the United States Supreme
Court has held that Public Law 280 is a "governing Act of Congress"
within the meaning of the text set forth in Williams v. Lee. 22 While
the court in Kennerly dealt principally with the question of whether
unilateral tribal action before 1968 was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon Montana to adjudicate a civil controversy,2 3 and while
the court decided that the proper procedural steps had not been
followed by either the state or the tribe in the required sequence,
the reasoning which underlies the decision is applicable to the present analysis. If Public Law 280 provides the governing Act of Congress by which a state assumes legislative jurisdiction to apply
its state tax laws (among its other laws of general application) then
one need not inquire whether the tax which the state Sees fit to
levy interferes with tribal self-government. 23 a One need only ask
whether the state has taken the proper steps under Public Law 280
to impose and collect that tax. If a state has not so acted, assuming,
arguendo, that Public Law 280 grants taxing authority, then it is
clear that its laws do not apply for the purpose of levying taxes
and collecting them as against Indians, Indian property, or Indian
activity within Indian country.
The essence of the Court's decision in Kennerly is that both
the tribe and the state must comply with the strict terms of the
statute for the assumption by the state of jurisdiction to adjudicate
causes of action in Indian country. The same reasoning applies
to jurisdiction to apply state tax laws, again assuming Public Law
280 grants taxing authority. Failure to comply with the terms of
Public Law 280 as amended leaves the state with no taxing authority
whatsoever.
The principal argument which the states have advanced in
an attempt to defeat this jurisdictional argument for Indian tax
immunity stems from the misreading by the states of Williams v.
Lee, and Organized Village of Kake v. Egan.24 There is, unfortunate21.a. "Essentially absent governing Acts of Congress. the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). (Emphasis added)
22. Kennerly v. Montana District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971).
23. Id. at 427.
23.a. If, however, Public Law 280 does not provide the means by which a state may apply its tax laws in Indian country, it does not necessarily follow that a state may enact
and enforce taxes which the state considers to be non-interfering as to tribal self-government. "Essentially applications of state law to Indians on reservations are per se infringements on the treaty-protected right of the tribe to make Its own laws and be ruled
by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). See, text accompanying notes 55-58,
infra, where it is argued that a finding of non-interference has resulted ornly in cases
where the challenged application of state law in Indian country had nothing to do with
Indians. And there is no other authorization for state taxation in Indian country.
24. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 869 U.S. 60 (1962).
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ly, unsupported dicta in both of those opinions which lends the
states some small mount of credibility in their arguments. The
trouble began with the formulation of the infringement test in Williams v. Lee. Ignoring Public Law 280, the states argued that since
there is no specific act prohibiting them from exercising taxing
jurisdiction, and since there is no act specifically authorizing it,
the test becomes whether the tax infringes upon the right of the
tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by them.2 5 The states then
launch into a general discussion of inter-governmental taxing immunity and the incidence of the tax which they attempt to impose.
As a first argument, it is appropriate to point out that the
infringement test was never intended to be so used. In Williams
v. Lee, the infringement test was articulated after a review of
certain cases and statutes purporting to permit the states to exercise certain powers within Indian country. A brief review of those
statutes and cases follows, but in summary it is sufficient to say
that the statutes are specific Acts of Congress authorizing expansion
of state power in very narrow and explicit circumstances and
none of the cases seeks to apply state law (whether tax law or
other law) to Indians.
In Williams, the Court reviewed the federal statutory and case
law developments affecting the doctrine announced in Worcester
v. Georgia. As an example of the changes which have occurred
the Court said: "Thus suits by Indians against outsiders in state
courts have been sanctioned. ' 28 This certainly does not expand
state power to legislate affecting Indians on reservations.
Williams also cites New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin.2 7 That
case does not support a state's assertion that state law may be
applied to. Indians on reservations absent interference with tribal
self-government. As in United States v. McBratney,28 and Draper
v. United States, 29 the case simply permitted state courts to assume
jurisdiction of the prosecution of one non-Indian for the murder
of another non-Indian. Clearly, none of these cases validates the
application of any state law' to any reservation Indian. While the
murders occurred in Indian country, the cases did not even involve
Indians.
In Utah Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher,30 cited in Williams,
the question of the power of the territory of Idaho to tax railroad
property within an Indian reservation was presented. The Supreme
25.

26.
(1926).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).

Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317

(1892); United States v. Candelaria,

New York ex rel. lay v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (194,6).
United States v. McBrantney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
Utah Northern Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
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Court sustained the tax in that case, but it was not called upon to
decide whether state action affecting Indians in Indian country
impaired tribal self-government. Although the railroad's property
was located within Indian country, the tax law did not affect Indians
in any way.-' The cases cited in Williams, rather than permitting
application of state laws to Indians, permit application of state
laws in cases having nothing to do with reservation self-government
or with reservation Indians at all.
The states also rely heavily upon the opinion in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan.32 Their reliance is misplaced. Kake involved
the question of whether Alaska could regulate trap-fishing by the
Kake and Angoon communities in Alaska. It was held that Alaska
could regulate the fishing because no reservation existed from which
the right to fish might be implied. A contrary result would have
been reached had such a reservation existed.33 The taxation of
Indians, their property and activities on reservations is entirely
distinguishable. The Navajo Nation, for example, is a self-governing tribe controlling a large territory which includes parts of three
states. The tribe's right to govern the Indians' internal affairs is
secured by treaty.3 4 Moreover, while Arizona, defendant in McClanahan, has assumed no jurisdiction in Indian Country, Congress
3 5
has explicitly granted Alaska jurisdiction.
Since the ratio decidendi of Kake was the absence of a reservation, the broad discussion of the changes in Indian law must
be regarded as dicta. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court concluded that:
These decisions indicate that even on reservations state laws
may be applied to Indians unless such application would
interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law.386
Justice Frankfurter might have conceived that state taxation
of Indians or their property on reservations "impair[s] a right
granted or reserved by federal law," even if it did not interfere
with reservation self-government. 7 But if this "rule" would require
a search of the treaties and statutes for explicit exemptions or
immunities from state taxation, then it constitutes an abrupt departure from the law announced in Williams. The Court in Williams
was quite clear as to the continuing vitality of Worcester v. Georgia:
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Accord, Maricopa and Phoenix Ry. v. Arizona Territory, 156 U.S. 347 (1895).
Organized Village of Rake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
Compare Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221, 222 (1959).
72 Stat. 545, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1953).
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
Id. at 75.
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Despite bitter criticism and the defiance of Georgia which
refused to obey this Court's mandate in Worcester the broad
principles of that decision came to be accepted as law. Over
the years this Court has modified these principles in cases
where essential tribal relations were not involved and where
the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic
policy of Worcester has remained. [Emphasis added.]8
Justice Frankfurter's conclusion was not relevant to the facts
in Kake, nor was it supportable by the authorities cited for it. The
principal cases relied upon in Kake are Williams v. Lee and Thomas
v. Gay. 9 Willliams explicitly rejected the assertion of state civil
jurisdiction relying at least in part upon Arizona's failure to acquire
jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Fisher, Maricopa, and Martin
clearly involved no application of state law or jurisdiction affecting
Indians.' 0
In Thomas v. Gay, another case cited by Justice Frankfurter
in Kake, the Court sustained an Oklahoma territorial law taxing
as personal property the cattle of non-Indians on an Indian reservation. Contrary to the dictum in Kake, this case does not involve
the application of the personal property tax law to Indians. Had
the territorial legislation intended to tax cattle owned by Indians,
42
the result would have been different.
In Langford v. Monteith,"4 a non-Indian sued another non-Indian
before a Justice of the Peace to obtain possession of certain buildings. The defendant claimed that he held the premises under the
Indian agent. Again, no effect at all is shown upon Indians, either
as to application of state law or the operation of the state's "cause
of action" jurisdiction over Indians. The Court said at page 147:
As there is no such treaty with the Nez Perce' Tribe, on
whose reservation the premises in dispute are situated, and
as it is a suit between -white men, citizens of the United
States, the Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction of the parties,
if the subject-matter was one of which he could take cognizance."
These cases are not cases which support a rule permitting
states to enforce laws and exercise jurisdiction when such state
action "affects Indians." Rather they permit application of state
law in cases where Indians are not involved at all. A state's
misuse of the dicta in Kake would result, if accepted, in judicial
establishment of taxing power not given by Congress.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

WillI ms v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880).
Id. at 147.
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In support of his broad conclusion Justice Frankfurter also
discussed statutory developments since Worcester in the Kake opinion. As to these statutes, it requires no argument that a congressional act conferring upon states the power to affect Indians in

one substantive area does not permit the state to exercise jurisdiction or apply its laws in any other substantive area. For example,
the 1929 enactment of 25 U.S.C. §23145 authorizing states to enforce
sanitation and quarantine laws on Indian reservations and to make
inspections for health and educational purposes, and to enforce
compulsory school attendance, does limit or encroach upon tribal

self-government to the extent set forth in that statute.16 That enactment does not, however, confer jurisdiction to tax the income of
Indians on Indian reservations. Similarly, the 1934 enactment authorizing the Secretary of Interior to enter into contracts with the

states for educational, medical, agricultural, and welfare assistance
to reservations, does not extend general jurisdiction to the states.
Provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1161,48 are limited to requiring that transactions regarding liquor on reservations be in conformity with state
law. If anything, these statutes demonstrate congressional recognition of tribal immunity in absence of an Act modifying such
immunity.
Therefore, while the statutes cited in Kake 9 are interesting
from an historical point of view, none except Public Law 280 can
be said to have any bearing on state taxing jurisdiction over Indians.
As Justice Black said, in Williams,
Significantly when Congress has wished the states to exercise
this power, it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction
which Worcester v. Georgia had denied.50
The discussion of statutory provisions in Kake should be regard45. 45 Stat. 1185, 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1929).
46. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 73 (1962).
47. 48 Stat 596, 25 U.S.C. § 452 (1936).
48. 67 Stat. 586, 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1966).
49. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 986, 987, 988, 25 U.S.C. I
461 et seq. (1935), was specifically designed to strengthen tribal government, and its
enactment certainly cannot be said to permit the application of State laws in Indian
country, nor can it be argued that this enactment reversed the doctrine of Worcester V.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515 (1932). The provisions of 64 Stat. 845 conferred civil Jurisdiction upon the courts of New York in civil actions involving Indians. Similarly, in 63
Stat. 705, certain regulatory jurisdiction is conferred upon the State of California over
lands and residents of the Agua Caliente Indian Reservation. See also 62 Stat. 1161,
1124 (1948). The termination legislation in the 1950's dealing with the Menominees (68
Stat. 250) and the Nlamaths (68 Stat. 718) did not purport to affect any other tribe in
any way. Moreover, the House Concurrent Resolution establishing the termination policy,
H.R. CONG. RES. 108, August 1, 1953, 67 Stat. 132, 83rd Cong. has been explicitly repudiated by President Nixon, Message to Congress, July 8, 1970, and by a later concurrent resolution which passed the Senate in 1970, U.S. CODE CONe. & ADMIN. NEwS 2965
as S. CON. RES. 26, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess. Such concurrent resolutions expire at the adJournment of the Congress. CANNON'S
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ed as dicta having no effect to limit the powers of an Indian tribe,
nor to enhance the power of a state to apply any tax on a reservation. The states seeking to tax Indians rely upon bootstrap arguments taken from dicta or historical discussions in opinions of the
Supreme Court which, in the cases upon which the states rely, refused to extend the application of state laws to reservation Indians. 5'
The state's interpretation of the infringement test must be rejected on the basis of a careful reading of Kennerly v. Montana District
Court.512 Kennerly presented exactly the same factual situation as

did Williams, but the Court relied upon Montana's failure to abide
by Public Law 28053 (as the governing Act of Congress for the as-

sumption of civil jurisdication) and upon the Tribe's failure to express
consent under the 1968 Amendment thereto. 54 Although tribal consent
was not a requirement for the assumption of jurisdiction by the
state in 1953, the Court could have decided the Williams case on
precisely the same ground as it later decided Kennerly. Since
Arizona had not chosen to exercise the power of unilateral assumption of jurisdiction which the Congress had offered in Public Law
83-280 it was unnecessary for the Williams court to reach the
infringement question. While Kennerly is based upon the construction of the method which the Blackfeet tribe sought to use in granting jurisdiction, the teaching of that case is equally applicable to
Williams: in order to assume jurisdiction in Indian country the state
(and now the tribe) must follow with precision the formula set
forth by the Congress.
It can be concluded therefore, that the infringement test in
Williams is not the proper starting point for an analysis of the
validity of any tax by the state on Indians in Indian country.
If Congress has assented at all to state taxation in Indian country
Public Law 280, as amended, is the "governing Act of Congress" for
the purposes of the assumption of the taxing power, just as Kennerly
held that it was a governing act of Congress for the purpose
of assuming jurisdiction over civil and criminal causes of action.
The failure of any state to abide by it leaves it without taxing
power, since the state has no "residual jurisdiction" to apply its
tax laws to Indians.

51. See, e.g., discussion of Arizona ex. rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.
1969) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970), in McClanahan v. State Tax Com'n., 484, P.2d
221, 223 (Ariz., 1971).
52. Kennerly v. Montana District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
53.

Montana assumed only

criminal jurisdiction. MONT.

REV.

CODE AN.

83-806 (1966). Kennerly v. Montana District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 425 (1971).
54. Kennerly v. Montana District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 428, 429 (1971).
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II.

RESISTING STATE TAXATION OF INDIANS:
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

If the jurisdictional argument outlined above should be rejected
in the Indian tax cases presently before the Supreme Court 55 there
are several fall-back positions for lawyers serving Indians to take.
If the Court were to hold, for example, that Public Law 280 is
not a governing Act of Congress with respect to application of
state tax laws, then, under the current state of the law, courts
would be compelled to determine in each individual case under
the Williams test whether state tax law infringed upon the right
of the tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by them. The first
argument under this heading is that any taxation of Indians, tribes,
or Indian property or activity within Indian country per se infringes
upon tribal self-government for the reason that it affects Indians.
In none of the cases which led to the articulation of the Williams
test was the application of any state law to Indians involved or
upheld. While this result would be less consistent with the dignity
of Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations and distinct political
communities, the practical result in the terms of the power of
state taxation would be the same.
Difficulty arises, however, from the arguments made by the
states in their briefs on all three cases pending before the Supreme
Court at this time. In those briefs, the states argue that the taxation
of individual Indian transactions does not in fact interfere with tribal
self-government. If each state tax is to be examined for a determination of whether it interferes with tribal self-government, then Indians might successfully argue that if the tribe has the power to tax
the same persons, property, or transactions there is a per se interference. The argument should probably be made that - where a
state tax interferes with the existence of taxing power in the tribe the state's tax is prohibited by the infringement test regardless
of whether that tribe chooses to exercise the particular taxing
power it possesses. Refusal to tax may comprehend important and
reasoned tribal decisions as to the ability of their members to
pay the tax, its effect on local tribal economic development, etc.
Non-exercise or non-use 56 of a tribal power should not be held
55. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 432 F.2d 956 (1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3512 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1971); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 14 Ariz. App. 452,
484 P.2d 221 (1971), prob. Juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1972). Tonasket v.
Washington, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971), prob. jwris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3588
(U.S. June 12, 1972).
56. Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, _
F. Supp._
, Civil
No. 1972-152 (W.D.N.Y. August 9, 1972). Moreover, Cohen states that failure to exercise
tribal criminal jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction on federal court. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF F EDERAL INDIAN LAw 148 (reprint 1942).
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either to extinguish the power, or to permit the state to exercise
power.
The foregoing discussion assumes that where tribal taxing power
exists, even if not exercised, it is exclusive. If it is held that
failure to exercise taxing power permits the state to tax on the
theory that it does not infringe upon tribal self-government, then
an incredible see-saw of taxing power and authority will develop
in which tribes will be compelled to enact and collect taxes, simply
in order to exclude the state from doing the same. But with a
repeal of the tribal tax it would then be urged that the state
may enact a like tax because it will no longer interfere with
the tribe's revenue base. In operation, however, such a holding
would transfer to the state the right to make governmental decisions
for Indian tribes on reservations within the state. By enacting
a state law to tax certain persons, property or transactions the
state effectively could dictate that the tribe must adopt a similar
judgment with respect to the wisdom of successfully taxing those
resources if the tribe is to exclude the state from exercising the
asserted taxing power. Even if the exercise of tribal taxing power
effectively excludes state taxing power over the same persons
and transactions, the right of tribal self-government is interfered
with, and the state's power on the reservation is expanded by
the negative force which the state can assert. Such a result is
inconsistent with the right of tribes to make their own laws and
be ruled by them and ought not be allowed under the traditional
formulation of the Williams test, even as that test is misinterpreted
in Kake.
It is also possible, of course, that it might be held that state
taxation is not precluded by either the existence of tribal power
or the actual exercise of tribal power to tax the transactions,
persons, and property. In short, concurrent taxing authority might
be held to exist. It is difficult to square such a holding with
the Williams infringement test. Just as in the case of exclusive
tribal power to tax where that power is exercised, the state has
power to dictate tribal governmental decisions as to taxation by
the imposition of the state's own taxes on persons, transactions,
or property in Indian country. The most obvious interference in
tribal self-government is the tapping of a small revenue base for
state purposes at the expense of the same tax base which is
used to produce revenue for the exercise of tribal governmental
functions. A clearer case of interference with tribal self-government
can hardly be imagined. In addition to raising tribal revenues,
taxing powers are clearly available for use as elements of fiscal
policy and "social engineering." The decision to enact certain taxes
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and not to enact others, and the decision to vary rates and exemptions
are highly sophisticated tools which can be used to encourage
particular kinds of business activity and property-holding and to
discourage other such activity. Tax incentives for the location and
operation of industry might be a decision which the state is willing
to make in a situation where an Indian tribe might choose to
foster collective agricultural economic activity or small cottage
industry instead. 57 The taxing decisions made or left unmade by
the governmental entity significantly affect the culture, economic
development, and collective goals of the people. Indian tribes must
have the ability to make decisions about the quality of life and
economic development upon their reservations unfettered by value
judgments made by state revenue directors or state legislators.
Interference with tribal self-government must be read in the Williams
infringement test to comprehend much more than simply competition
between the state and the tribe for a particular dollar of revenue.
Concurrent taxing power, vested in a state, can be a powerful
weapon for the advancement of state interests rather than tribal
interests. It is for this reason that state attempts to tax on Indian
reservations are arrogant, and potentially genocidal to Indian communities.
It is the policy of the United States Government to permit
self-determination among Indians and Indian tribes. 5 Whether or
not this remains a current federal policy, it is likely that self-determination will continue to be the desire of many Indian tribes and
communities. No amount of sophistry can alter the result that any
increase in state taxing power on reservations governed by Indian
tribes works to the detriment of federal policy and the very independence and internal sovereignty of Indian tribes.
III. RESISTING STATE TAXATION OF INDIANS:
THE FEDERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The argument has been made that Indians are immune from
state taxes because the state has no .general jurisdiction on reservations.
[T]his jurisdictional immunity from state taxation is sometimes buttressed by: (a) The judicial doctrine that states
may not tax a federal instrumentality, operating upon the
assumption that various incidents of Indian property are
federal instrumentalities, . . . It is not clear whether . . .
[this] added reason need be advanced to justify the im57.
58.
22131

The reverse might also be true.
President Richard M. Nixon's Message to Congress, July 8, 1970, 116 CoNG. REc.
(1970).
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munity of Indian property on an Indian reservation from
state property taxes.5 9
Writing prior to Williams, Cohen did not anticipate that tribal
immunity from all exercises of state power would be attacked
through the use of the infringement test developed for the protection
of the tribes.
In the foregoing sections, it has been argued that Indians,
their property and their activity on reservations are immune from
state taxation by reason of the absence of state jurisdiction to tax.
It has also been argued that when a state under Public Law
280 has failed to acquire civil and criminal jurisdiction, the state
should also be denied permission to tax on a reservation for the
reason that the imposition of the tax interferes with tribal self-government. Should these arguments be rejected, there is yet another
fall-back argument for lawyers serving Indians to make. The
policy of the United States to foster Indian economic development
may not be hindered by state taxation. This argument, described
below and based upon federal supremacy in Indian affairs is also
essential when tribes seek to enter into profit-making activities
outside of the boundaries of the reservation, or where states seek
to apply tax laws to Indians, their property or activity, on Indian
lands which are either not within Indian reservations over which
a tribe exercises powers of self-government, or where the Indian
lands are located in a state which has assumed jurisdiction under
the terms of Public Law 280.
This third line of argument is premised upon the supremacy
of the federal government in the field of Indian affairs and the
manifest commitment of the federal government to Indian economic
development. 60 Perez, recognizing that the current state of the
law regarding Indian immunity from state taxation is, at best,
filled with faulty reasoning and results inconsistent with maximum
economic development, proposes a coherent rationale for the immunization of Indian property and activity from state taxation on
the basis of "Indian-related" exemptions mandated by the federal
policies of protecting Indian land as a base for economic development, and affording Indian tribes some sovereignty from state
and local government.
The federal policy of fostering Indian economic development
is clearly articulated with respect to Indian land and personal
property by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
59.
60.

F. COHEN, H ANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 254. (reprint 1942).
See Perez, Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 CAL,

L. Rev. 1261 (1971).
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Rickert.61 With respect to economic activity by Indian tribes, the
concern of the federal government is expressed by such provisions
as 25 U.S.C. §470 which establishes a revolving credit program.
The Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934,62 was enacted
(1) To stop the alienation, through action by the Government or the Indian, of such lands, belonging to ward Indians,
as are needed for the present and future support of these
Indians.
(2) To provide for the acquisition, through purchase, of land
for Indians, now landless, who are anxious and fitted to make
a living on such land.
(3) To stabilize the tribal organization of Indian tribes by
vesting such tribal organizations with real, though limited,
authority, and by prescribing conditions which must be met
by such tribal organizations.
(4) To permit Indian tribes to equip themselves with the
devices of modern business organization, through forming
themselves into business corporations.
(5)

To establish a system of financial credit for Indians.

(6) To supply Indians with means for collegiate and technical training in the best schools.
(7) To open the way for qualified Indians to hold positions
in the Federal Indian Service. 6
Most recently, the federal government's commitment to Indian
economic development has been expressed by President Nixon in
these words:
It is critically important that the federal government support and encourage efforts which help Indians develop their
own economic infrastructure.64
It is unnecessary to observe that federal policy in favor of
economic development for Indians stems from the exploitation of
Indians and the dependent economic position into which they were
put when located on reservations. From the constitutional warmaking power, treaty-making power, from the power to regulate
commerce among the Indian tribes, there arose the duty of federal
61. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
62. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 983, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq, (1935), of which § 470
is a part.
63. SEN. REP. No. 1080, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess. (May 10 [Calendar Day, May 22]
1934).
64.
"Indian Affairs," The President's Message to Congress, 6 WEEKLY COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 894, 900-01 (1970).
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protection of Indians. 65 The supremacy clause is the source of
constitutional protection from state interferences with this federal
policy of Indian economic development.
Given any policy within the delegated powers of the federal
government, it had long been established that a state is without
power to interfere with the instrumentalities chosen by the federal
government for the carrying out of its purpose, even when the
interference is inherent in state taxation. 66
The teaching of McCulloch v. Maryland was clearly applied
to the field of federal Indian policy in United States v. Rickert."7
There, the Court made it clear that the lands allotted to Indians
under the General Allotment Act were federal instrumentalities
for the economic rehabilitation of the federal wards and, therefore,
not subject to state taxation. The Court went on to hold that
permanent improvements in personal property used in connection
with the land were also immune from state taxation. The Court
reasoned that unburdened property and improvements were necessary to foster the federal policies of maximizing the economic
potential of Indian lands.
The personal property in question was purchased with the
money from the government, and was furnished to the Indians
in order to maintain them on the land allotted during the
period of the trust estate, and to induce them to adopt the
habits of civilized life. It was, in fact, the property of the
United States, and was put into the hands of the Indians to
be used in execution of the purpose of the government in
reference to them. The assessment and taxation of personal
property 8 would necessarily have the effect to defeat that
purpose.
At least in part, the Court's holding in RickerV9 was premised
upon the fact that state taxation of Indian land, improvements,
or personal property used thereon, woulld burden the federal purpose
in such a way as to make it impossible for the United States
to keep its agreement to convey the land to the Indian at the
conclusion of the trust period, free from all encumbrances. This
commitment on the part of the United States, which finds expression in Section 6 of the General Allotment Act, is also the basis
for the holding in Squire v. Capoeman,70 that the federal government did not intend to tax as capital gains the proceeds of sale
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 433-34 (1903).
Id. at 433-34.
Id. at 443-44.
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
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from timber from an Indian allotment. The Court held that the
rule regarding Indian federal tax exemptions is different from that
pertaining to non-Indian exemptions, for the former tax exemptions
could be implied while the latter must be based on an explicit
congressional act. The Court of Claims, in Mason v. United States,7'
applied similar reasoning regarding the burden imposed on the
trust land by a state inheritance tax and struck down the tax rely7 2
ing on Squire v. Capoeman.
The touchstone of these cases is the finding that use of federal
trust land as an instrument of federal policy for the economic
development and rehabilitation of its Indian wards may only be
limited by explicit congressional action. The Indian land should be
regarded as the federal instrumentality, and state taxation of any
sort of which minimizes the profitability of the use of the trust land
for economic development of Indians must be rejected under the
supremacy clause as interference with federal Indian policy and a
burden upon a federal instrumentality.
Assuming that profitable use of Indian land is necessary for
the fulfillment of the federal economic development objective, cases
which have eroded the tax immunity of federal instrumentalities
relying on the narrow application of implied governmental immunity
unit should be regarded as inapplicable as precedent in Indian
cases. It is submitted that courts are improperly following the
federal instrumentality rationale which is appropriate to cases involving governmental objectives, the profitability of which is not
essential (if the activity is performed), but inappropriate in cases
involving the instrumentalities used by the federal government for
78
Indian economic development.
Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Commissioners 7 4 is
an important case which stands for the proposition that a state
tax which interferes with a federal policy aimed at profitability
of the instrumentality chosen by the government for the accomplishment of economic development objectives is invalid. In Federal
Land Bank, a subdivision of the state sought to tax mineral estate
interests held by the Federal Land Bank. The revenues earned
by the Federal Land Bank were paid to its borrower-shareholders,
thereby fulfilling the federal purpose of enabling the Federal Land
75
Bank to make low-interest loans.
71. Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, (Ct. C1. 1972).
72. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
73. See Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184,
1187 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissenting).
74. Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146 (1961).
75. Federal Land Bank also stands for the proposition that no federal functions are
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It is important to note
under this argument is the
the income, or the conduct
land. If income is earned

that the sine qua non of non-taxability
location of the property, the earning.of
of the transaction on protected Indian
from the land by Indian owners, it
6

7
is now regarded as exempt for federal income tax purposes. It

should, of course, be so regarded for state income tax purposes.
The current state of the law seems to be that if income is earned
77
on the land but not from it, no federal tax exemption results.
Likewise, if the individual Indian leases trust land (even from
the tribe) but has no other 'enforceable right as to the land, his
78
income earned therefrom is likely to be taxable.
If income-producing property is located on Indian trust land,
whether it is owned by an Indian or non-Indian, it is suggested
that maximization of the rental return of the trust land requires
that the property be immunized from state taxation. While this
is, no doubt, the law with respect to personal property only when
used by Indians, 79 state taxation of property used on Indian trust
land by non-Indians has not yet been prohibited.
One case directly addressing tle impact of state taxation of
non-Indian cattle on Indian land is Thomas v. Gay. 80 In that case,
the Court concluded that the effect on Indians or their land was
"too remote" to require invalidation of the tax.
A much more recent case suggests that the goal of maximization
of the profitability of the use of Indian land may not be sufficient
to immunize from state taxation all uses of the land by non-Indians.
In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,"
the possessory interest of the long-term lessee of Indian lands
was taxed by the state, and the tax was upheld notwithstanding
the fact that such a tax would obviously diminish the rental value
of the protected Indian land.
State sales taxes on transactions between licensed Indian traders
and Indians are now immunized by Warren Trading

Post 8 2

The

reasoning in Warren Trading Post was that the federal government
had completely occupied the field of regulation of Indian traders.
It could also be argued that since the use of protected Indian
"Proprietary" In that any function properly performed by the federal government
Its delegated powers is necessarily "governmental." Id. at 150.

under

76. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741
(9th Cir. 1971).
77. Commissioner v. Walker, 326 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1964).
78. Holt v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1966).
79. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) ; Pourfer v. Shannon County Comm'r.,
157 N.W.2d 532 (S.D. 1968).
80. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
81. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th
Cir. 1971).
82. Warren Trading Post, 380 U.5. 685 (1965).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

land by an Indian for the sale or transaction of business would
increase the profitability of the land, and assist in the economic
rehabilitation of Indians, state sales taxes should likewise be invalidated as inconsistent with the federal purpose of economic development.
Finally, state taxes on the transfer of Indian lands, whether
by inheritance or by sale, should be disallowed; federal and state
taxation of such property violates the purpose of the General Allotment Act in preserving free from encumbrance the Indians' ownership of the land, and as well, taxation of the transfer of the land
minimizes its value to the Indian owner. However once the land is
transferred to non-Indian owners, it should no longer be immunized
from taxation.
From the foregoing, an argument can be made to immunize
activity and property from state taxation to the extent that state
taxation will impair the value of Indian land upon which property
is used or transactions conducted. It is important to note that this
argument deals with Indian land, and not simply with Indian land
within reservations governed by organized tribes. In the latter case,
absence of state jurisdiction to tax may be urged, and interference
with tribal sovereignty may also be advanced, as reasons for the
inability of the state to tax. There is no reason to suppose, however,
that the federal policy of economic development is terminated by
the assumption by the state of general jurisdiction under Public Law 280. As the brief of the Native American Rights Fund
in Tonasket v. Washington,8 3 points out, Public Law 280 may
confer only limited jurisdiction upon states, many federal
policies with regard to Indians, not specifically repealed or abrogated
by Public Law 280, may continue. In Tonasket, it is argued that
the federal statutes regulating Indian traders, 4 had not been repealed, and that therefore, preemption of trade regulation as set
forth in Warren Trading Post should apply on reservations in Public
Law 280 states. Similarly, since Public Law 280 does not have the
effect of terminating federal supervision, it should be argued that
the policy of economic development for Indians continues, notwithstanding the state assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280.
If, therefore, a state's attempted taxation of transactions and property interferes with the economic development of Indians in Public
Law 280 states, it should be opposed notwithstanding the fact that
the state may have criminal and civil jurisdiction for other purposes.
Immunization of Indian property and activity should be urged in
83. Tonasket v. Washington, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971), prob. juris. noted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 12, 1972).
84. 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1943).

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

all cases where there is an intimate connection to trust land. The
theoretical underpinnings of the argument for Indian tax immunity
are lost unless there is this nexus.
It is important to make still another point with respect to
immunization of Indians and their property from taxation. Rickert
involved property that was issued to the Indians by the United
States and perhaps owned by the United States. But so long as
the property is used for the federal purpose of Indian economic
rehabilitation, the source or origin of the property used in connection with the Indian trust land, should be irrelevant. Accordingly,
if the property used for the economic exploitation of Indian trust
land and the economic benefit of Indians has been acquired by
expenditure of wages and salaries, gifts, or loans from other
sources than the federal government, the property used should,
nonetheless be exempt from state taxation. One court has so held.85
It is also appropriate to observe that federal purposes regarding
Indians which justify immunization of property and transactions
from state taxation, are not limited to profit-making use of Indian
land. In addition to economic rehabilitation, one federal purpose
in connection with the allotment of Indian land to individuals was
the provision of such land as a place of residence for the Indian
allottees. Accordingly, a state should not be permitted to tax a
mobile home purchased by an Indian with wages and used by
the Indian to provide a place of residence on his trust land (whether
on or off-reservation, and whether in a Public Law 280 state or
not) .88

Primary emphasis has been placed on the use of Indian trust
land for economic development purposes and upon the immunization
of property and transactions in connection with such land from
state taxation. There is yet another subject under the general heading of the federal policy of economic development for Indians which
merits discussion. Occasionally, an Indian tribe may itself go into
business for the purpose of raising revenues in order to discharge
its governmental responsibilities. This was the case in Mescalero
Apache v. Jones et al. 7 There the Native American Rights Fund
argued that the Mescalero Apache Tribe itself was a federal instrumentality and that its gross receipts and personal property were
85. Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442 (1968).
86. If the tribe operates on Its reservation, the state arguably lacks Jurisdiction to tax
the tribes property, revenue or activity, and such lack of jurisdiction might be predicated
upon failure to assume jurisdiction or upon Interference with tribal self-government. To
the extent that the tribe uses its trust land for economia development purposes, the
reasoning In the foregoing section applies.
87. Mescalero Apache v. Jones, 432 F.2d 956 (1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3512
(U.S. Dec. 4, 1971).
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exempt from state taxation by reason of the immunity of the federal
88
instrumentality from state taxation.
In such cases, the tribe itself is the federal vehicle for the
fulfillment of federal duties for the economic rehabilitation of Indians. The tribe may be chartered under the Indian Reorganization
Act, 89 and it may acquire funds by borrowing from the United
States under 25 U.S.C. §470. Substantial federal supervision may
be exercised, and federal lands may be acquired pursuant to 25
U.S.C. §465 for the purpose of furthering the tribe's economic
activity. When tribal activity is sought to be taxed by the state,
the state will raise the argument that the Supreme Court has narrowed intergovernmental taxing immunity and the federal instrumentality doctrine. Never, however, has the Court allowed a state
to tax an entity which is an instrumentality without a congressional
waiver of immunity from state taxation. Moreover, it can be argued
that the cases that have eroded the intergovernmental immunity doctrine can be distinguished for they involve either (a) a private individual seeking to immunize himself and his personal profits on the
basis of some service to the government or (b) a federal purpose
involving only the accomplishment of a particular objective (and not
the federal profitability purpose inherent in federal Indian policies).
It should also be demonstrated that a tribe meets all of the qualifications for federal instrumentality even under the current articulation
of the tests for government instrumentality status.90
In summary, where a tribe operates off the reservation to earn
monies which are allocated to the fulfillment of the tribal and
federal goal of economic rehabilitation of Indians, such tribal enterprises should be regarded as federal instrumentalities and therefore
immune from state taxation.
IV. PUBLIC LAW 280 AND INDIAN TAXATION
In Tonasket v. Washington,9 1 the Supreme Court will consider
for the first time the scope of the congressional conferral of criminal
and civil jurisdiction made pursuant to Public Law 280.
88. In connection with Individual activity, even if there is no clear federal instrumentality Involved, a federal purpose for the economic rehabilitation of Indians may be divined from such things as the use of Indian Business Development Fund loans, the use of
tribal bulls In cattle enterprises, provision of boss farmer services to the Indian rancher,
the use of a cattle replacement program or the revolving cattle pool under 25 C.F.R., Part
92 (1957). In short, any technical assistance, financial, or other federal activity may suipport the conclusion that the Indians activity or property and the Income therefrom is part
of a federal purpose for his economic rehabilitation. He should, therefore be immunized
from state taxation.
89. Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 35, 25 U.S.C. § 476, 477 (1970).
90. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966); First Agricultural Nat'l. Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 353 (1968)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Since the case involves the attempted taxation of an Indian
trader, the Court will have to consider whether Congress, in enacting
Public Law 280, tacitly repealed the long-standing federal statutes
and regulations governing trade with Indians insofar as they concern
Indian lands over which a state assumes civil and criminal jurisdiction. Similarly, the Court will consider whether and to what
extent the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction under Public
Law 280 constitutes a grant to the State of Washington of the author92
ity to assert comprehensive state taxation within Indian lands.
Public Law 280 is entitled "An Act to confer jurisdiction . . . [on
certain states] with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of
action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such
States... ." The House Report on H.R. 1063, which became Public
Law 280, speaks of the bill as part of a series of measures with two
co-ordinate aims: withdrawing federal responsibility for Indians
where practicable and authorizing selected state court jurisdiction
and law enforcement.9 3 Some of the measures proposed to achieve
these aims were the complete termination of federal responsibility
over certain Indian tribes, including distribution of tribal funds
and disposition of trust property; the termination of federal services
for Indians; and provision for the issuance of certificates of competency to Indians allowing them to withdraw from tribes and receive a share of tribal property.94 However, H.R. 1063 itself was
not termination legislation and was presented as a more modest
solution to a specific problem. The problem addressed by H.R.
1063, according to the committee report, was the inadequacy of law
enforcement and of the adjudication of civil conflicts in some Indian
lands:
As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order
among the Indians in the Indian country has been left largely
to the Indian groups themselves. In many states, tribes are
not adequately organized to perform that function; consequently, there has been created a hiatus in law-enforcement
authority that could best be remedied by conferring criminal
jurisdiction on States indicating an ability and willingness
to accept such responsibility.
Similarly, the Indians of several States have reached a stage
91.

Tonasket v. Washington, 79 Wash.

2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971),

prob. juris. noted,

40 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 12, 1972).
92. Portions of this discussion are taken from the Amicus Briefs of the U. S. Government, the National Congress of American Indians and the Native American Rights Fund
in

Tonasket v.

Washington, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281

(1971),

prob. juris. noted, 40

U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 12, 1972).
93. H. RLP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. p. 3; S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 3.
94. H. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. p. 3; S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
p. 3.
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of acculturation and development that makes desirable extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country within
their borders. Permitting State courts to adjudicate civil
controversies arising on Indian reservations, and to extend
to those reservations the substantive civil laws of the respective States insofar as those laws are of general application to private persons or private property, is deemed desirable.
After consideration of the proposed legislation, the committee
concluded that: any legislation in this area should be on a
general basis, making provision for all affected States to
come within its terms; that the attitude of the various States
and the Indian groups within those States on this diction
transfer question should be heavily weighed before effecting
transfer; and that any recommended legislation should retain
application of Indian tribal customs and ordinances to civil
transactions among the Indians, insofar as these customs or95
ordinances are not inconsistent with applicable State laws.
That the bill was considered by those who dealt with it to be a
law and order measure and not a general termination of federal
responsibility, is apparent. The law amended Titles 18 and 28 of
the Code, and not Title 25 in which the general provisions for federal
protection of Indians and statutes terminating such protection are
found. The law contains broad provisos, apparently intended to
make clear that the grant of state jurisdiction would not affect
the trust status of Indian property or the regulation of it contrary
to federal treaty, agreement or statute. 96 There is no indication
in the legislative history that Public Law 280 was intended to
terminate existing federal regulation and supervision of Indian country. Moreover, there is no indication in the committee reports
or debates that a conferral of civil and criminal jurisdiction under
9 6a
Public Law 280 would extend the power of the State to tax Indians,
although if this were intended it would have been a matter of
sufficient importance to be set before Congress. Indeed, the sweeping
restriction of §4 prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of any
real or personal trust or restricted property manifests a congressional intent not to grant to the states significant taxing powers,
95.
I. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., lst Sess. p. 6; S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
p. 5.
96. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, §§ 2(b), 4(b), 67 Stat. 588; 18
U.S.C. 1162(b), 28 U.S.C. 1360:(b) (1970).
96.aLegislative history of Public Law 280 which has been unavailable until now came
to light recently in connection with the amicus brief filed by the United States in Tonasket. This legislative history shows: (1) that Congress was concerned almost exclusively
with law and order and criminal jurisdiction and (2) that Congress understood that
states assuming Jutrisdiction would get no direct federal subsidy, and no increased revenue
base from which to meet additional governmental expense attributable to the exercise of
Jurisdiction In Indian country. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearings on
H.R. 1063, Wednesday, July 15, 1953 and Monday, June 29, 1953.
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for the enforcement scheme of most states contemplates upon nonpayment the levy and seizure of real and personal property.
Moreover, the absence of a congressional plan to have Public
Law 280 confer on the states the authority to terminate federal
regulation and supervision of Indian commerce, to substitute their
own regulation and to impose comprehensive state taxation is demonstrated by the continuation of large-scale federal assistance programs for Public Law 280 reservations97 and by the failure of
Public Law 280 states to assume the burden of providing comprehensive state services to Indians consenting to state criminal and
civil jurisdiction.
Although Public Law 280 could be interpreted as authorizing
an expansive conferral of legislative authority, the Supreme Court
in Kennerly v. District Court of Montana,8 Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan,99 and Menominee Tribe v. United States'00 has
consistently construed Public Law 280 as a limited conferral of
state judicial power, not designed to extinguish or interfere with
federal policies regarding Indians.
In Kennerly v. District Court of Montana,1°1 the Supreme Court
concluded that the State of Montana had improperly undertaken
the assertion of civil and criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Public
Law 280. The Court held that it was necessary to proceed cautiously
and deliberately when permitting state action to impinge on the
affairs of reservation Indians, observing:
Our conclusion . . . is reinforced by the comprehensive and
detailed Congressional scrutiny manifested in those instances
where Congress has undertaken to extend the civil10 2or criminal
jurisdiction of certain States to Indian country.
Similarly, in Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan,0 3 the Court
interpreted Public Law 280 and the exception clause thereunder
as providing a broad and comprehensive exception to the imposition
of state, civil, and criminal jurisdiction. The Court stated, "This
statute expressly protects against state invasion of all uses of Indian
property authorized by federal treaty, agreement, statute, or regulation. . . ."104 In Menominee Tribe v. United States,40 5 the Court
97. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, for example, reports expenditures of $14,072,394 for
fiscal year 1971 in California although Public Law 280 subjected all Indian lands within
that State to state civil and criminal jurisdiction. The only major category of assistance
omitted is "maintaining law and order."
98. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
99. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1961).
100. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
101. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
102. Id. at 427.
103. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1961).
104. Id. at 56.
105. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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again construed Public Law 280, this time in pari materia with
the Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954. The Menominee
Termination Act was by its terms to provide for the orderly termination of federal supervision over tribal members and tribal property, but Public Law 280, although conferring civil and criminal
jurisdiction on the State of Wisconsin, was nevertheless held to
preserve for the tribe all hunting, trapping or fishing rights previously granted.
Recent congressional and executive actions have clarified Public
Law 280 as conferring limited state judicial authority, not including
the power to terminate federal responsibility and supervision over
Indian tribes nor the power to assert comprehensive state taxation.
In 1968, Public Law 280 was amended to require tribal consent
before a state could assert civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country, to allow assertion by a state of only a part of its civil and
criminal jurisdiction and to allow states to retrocede jurisdiction
previously acquired under Public Law 280.106 The legislative history
of these amendments indicates that they were initially proposed
because Indian tribes had been critical of Public Law 280 because
it authorized unilateral applications of state law without the consent
of the tribes and without regard to the special needs and circumstances of an individual tribe. Furthermore, in some tribes Public
Law 280 resulted in an unnecessary pre-emption of tribal law with
a resulting breakdown in law and order.1 07 The 1968 amendments
evidence congressional disillusion with the concept of allowing uncontrolled assertion of state jurisdiction over Indian country without
regard to the best interest of Indians.
President Richard M. Nixon has taken a strong stand against
previous executive and congressional policies favoring fundamental
change in the special historical and legal relationships between
the federal government and Indian tribes. 1 08 Present executive policies against termination of the special federal Indian status and
in favor of strong tribal self-government are based on solemn obligations entered into by the United States Government in exchange
for vast tracts of land surrendered by Indians and on findings
which show that the practical result of removing the federal trusteeship has been to produce considerable disorientation among affected
Indians in their dealings with a myriad of federal, state and local
governments.
The present congressional and executive policies favoring Indian
106. Pub. L. No. 9-284, 82 Stat. 70, codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1322 et seq. (1970).
107. Comments of Senator Sam Ervin, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(1968).
108. Message to Congress, July 8, 1970, 116 CONa. REc. 23131 (1970).

1865, 1866
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self-government and the preservation of federal responsibility are
premised on the failure of recent termination policies. The Supreme
Court's limiting interpretation of Public Law 280 is consistent with
two United States Circuit Court opinions which turned directly on
an interpretation of the scope of Public Law 280. In Kirkwood
v. Arenas,10 9 the court considered in a Public Law 280 jurisdiction
whether a trust allotment of the Agua Caliente Band of Indians
was exempt from a California inheritance tax and held the allotment
not taxable because taxation would conflict with existing federal
exemptions provided to the Agua Caliente Indians and with the
exception clause of Public Law 280 which the court stated "[m]erely
negatives the ideas that any change in the law as to 'alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation' of Indian property was intended." 110 In
United States v. Burland,11 the court considered whether Public
Law 280 was intended to confer Montana State criminal jurisdiction
over the people as well as the lands of the Salish and Kootenai
tribes. The court construed Public Law 280 narrowly, arguing that
Public Law 280 was only part of a larger federal legislative program relating to Indians and that other separate legislation was
contemplated to affect specific disabilities and limitations applicable
to Indians.
The Supreme Court of Washington also adopted the Supreme
Court's limiting view of Public Law 280 in Snohomish County v.
Seattle Disposal Company,'1 2 and in Sohol v. Clark'" requiring in
each case a showing of an independent congressional authorization
apart from Public Law 280, in order to sustain Washington's legislative assertion against Indian country.
The legislative history as well as the cases interpreting Public
Law 280 would appear to provide a strong and convincing basis
for arguing that a state cannot utilize Public Law 280 to authorize
comprehensive state taxation in Indian country.
Notwithstanding these arguments, from a literal reading of Public Law 280 it can be argued that the "civil jurisdiction" conferred
on the state envisioned not simply access to state judicial machinery
but also contemplated state regulation and taxation of commerce
so long as the state does not tax real or personal property in
trust or regulate the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any federal treaty, agreement, statute or regulation.'" How109. Kirkwood v Arenas, 243 F.2d 863 (9th Cir., 1957).
110. Id. at 865.
111. United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1971).
112. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Company, 70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22
(1967).
113. Sohol v. Clark, 71 Wash. 2d 664, 430 P.2d 548 (1967), second appeal, 78 Wash. 2d
84.1, 479 P.2d 925 (1971).
114. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280,, ch. 505 § 4(b), 67 Stat. 588, 28 U.S.C.
1360(b) (1970).
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ever, a careful reading of the statute would suggest a more limited
congressional intent.
Public Law 280 has two operative clauses relevant to the civil
aspect. The first says that
[the state] shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action
115
between Indians or to which Indians are parties ....
The second says that
. . . those civil laws of the State or Territory that are of
general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State .. .11
A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that Congress
never intended "civil laws" to mean the entire array of state noncriminal laws, but rather that Congress intended "civil laws" to
mean those laws which have to do with private rights and status.
Therefore, "civil laws . . . of general application to private persons
or private property" would include the laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., but would not include laws
declaring or implementing the states' sovereign powers, such as
the power to tax, grant franchises, etc. These are not within the
fair meaning of "private" laws. The Senate Report characterized
the bill as relating to
. . . criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed
or arising on Indian reservations within such States . . .117
This does not reveal an intent that the states acquire broad sovereign
powers over Indians such as the taxing power.
The dictionary meaning of "civil" corroborates this reading
of Public Law 280. Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition, defines "civil" as follows:
"8. Law. Relating to the private rights of individuals in a
community and to legal proceedings in connection with them;
pertaining to rights and remedies sought by action or suit
distinct from criminal proceedings . . ."
There is nothing here to hint at the great sovereign powers which
states claim they receive as a result of the enactment of Public
Law 280.
115. Id. at § 1360(a) (emphasis added).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. S. RLP. No. 699, 83 Cong. (1953).

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

In a number of cases, courts have held that certain non-criminal
proceedings involving the exercise of sovereign powers are not
"civil" proceedings. Of course those were special contexts and of
little relevance, yet they add further corroboration to the normal
connotation of "civil" (especially as used in Public Law 280) as
referring to private rights, as opposed to sovereign powers over
citizens. Congress was not concerned that the states lacked these
powers on the reservation, but with the absence of a functioning
system for the resolution of private rights.
In conclusion, it would appear that Congress in enacting Public
Law 280 had in mind a more normal definition of "civil laws" than
certain states are currently asserting. If there is any doubt about
the scope of Public Law 280, it should be resolved in favor of preserving the tribal powers of self-government.
V. TAXATION BY INDIAN TRIBES
The recent assertion of state taxation against reservation Indians
as manifested in McClanahan,118 Mescalero, and Tonasket 19 is based
in part upon the misconceived conviction that Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 20 and Williams V. Lee 121 established the principle

of state residual jurisdiction over Indian affairs except where (1)
Congress has specifically pre-empted the field; or (2) Exercise of
state jurisdiction interferes with the Indian's right of sellf-government. Moreover, the states argue that where there is no actual
conflict between federal and state authority and where the state
action is in an area left void in fact by Indian local self-government,
they retain residual jurisdiction to assert state taxation. In effect,
the states are arguing that state taxation of Indian business does
not interfere with the Indian right of self-government under circumstances where in fact Indian tribes do not tax Indians or non-Indians
with respect to business activities taking place on Indian reservations. This position of the states is responsible in part for the increasing momentum in favor of state assertion of power in Indian country
and has left Indians responding defensively to state assertions of
taxation. It is suggested that rather than responding defensively,
Indians should accept in effect the challenge of the states, affirmatively seize the initiative and assert those taxation powers which
they inherently possess to tax enterprises on Indian reservations.
118. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971),
prob. juria. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1972).
119. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 432 F.2d 956 cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3512
(U.S. Dec. 4, 1971). Tonasket v. Washington, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971),
prob. Yurie noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 12, 1972).
120. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
121. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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Williams v. Lee 122 established the proposition that in the absence
of a governing Act of Congress, the test for determining the legality
of the state assertion is whether the state action infringes on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them. Williams v. Lee 123 held that the State of Arizona did
not have jurisdiction over a civil action brought by a non-Indian
against an Indian for the price of goods sold to the latter on
the Navajo Indian Reservation. Similar facts were presented in
Kennerly v. Judicial District of Montana-24 where the Supreme Court

indicated that Public Law 280 was a governing Act of Congress,
and that since the State of Montana had failed to adopt Public
Law 280 properly, it lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court
determined that Public Law 280, which by its specific language
involves questions of criminal and civil jurisdiction with respect
to Indians on Indian reservations as well as the applicability of state
laws to Indians on Indian reservations, controlled the issue of whether
a state had jurisdiction over Indians. Accordingly, jurisdiction was
to be determined by whether Public Law 280 had been properly
adopted and not by reference to the infringement test. Necessarily,
the infringement test was only used to determine the question
of jurisdiction over non-Indians while residing or doing business
in Indian country. It is with respect to non-Indians that the assertion
by state taxing authorities that there is no conflict between state
authority and tribal authority (when state assertion deals with an
area left void in fact by Indians) which demands a strong tribal
response. Therefore, with respect to the treatment of non-Indians,
it is submitted that Indian tribes should undertake affirmative taxation.
It is well settled that one of the powers essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to levy taxes. This power
is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty and it continues unless
124
withdrawn or limited by treaty or by Act of Congress. a The inherent

power of tribal governments to tax has been established in three
2
major cases, Buster v. Wright,
2 7
Tribe.
Crow v. Oglala Sioux

122.
123.
124.

5

Morris v. Hitchcock, 1 26 and Iron

Id.
Id.
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).

324.a. Tribal

criminal

jurisdiction to punish murder was Inherent prior to enactment of

the Major Crimes Act in 1885. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Recently,
tribal eminent domain powers, long unused, have been recognized as inherent Seneca
Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, et al, 348 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
125. Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906).
126. Morris v. Hitchcock, 21 App. D.C. 565 (1903), affirmed, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
127. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). See generally F. S.
Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 25 MINN. L. REv. 145 (1942).
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In Buster v. Wright,'12 the Creek Nation, one of the Five Civilized Tribes, had imposed a tax on all persons, not citizens of
the Creek Nation, who traded within the borders of that nation.
The plaintiffs in the case were traders doing business on townsites
within the boundaries of the Creek Nation who sought to enjoin
the Creek Nation from closing down their businesses for non-payment
of taxes. The decision of the trial court which dismissed the case
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit stated:
[T]he authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms
upon which non-citizens may transact business within its borders did not have its origin in an act of Congress, treaty
or agreement of the United States. It was one of the inherent
and essential attributes of its original sovereignty. It was a
natural right of that people indispensable to its autonomy
as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute
of its government until by the agreement of the nation itself
or
by the superior power of the republic it is taken from
it.129
Buster v. Wright dealt with a license or privilege tax on business and the principles therein should be equally applicable to a
tax on property.
In Morris v. Hitchcock,1 0 the Chickasaw Tribe proposed a tax
on cattle owned by non-citizens of that nation, that grazed on
private land within the tribal boundaries. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia stated:
A government of this kind necessarily has the power to maintain its existence and effectiveness through the exercise of
the usual power of taxation upon all property within its
limits, save as may be restricted by its organic law. Any
restriction in the organic law in respect of this ordinary
power of taxation, and the property subject thereto, ought
to appear by express provision or necessary implication. . ..
Where the restriction upon this exercise of power by a recognized government is claimed under the stipulations of a
treaty with another, whether the former be dependent upon
the latter or not, it would seem that its existence ought to
appear beyond a reasonable doubt. We discover no such restriction in the clause of Article 7 of the Treaty of 1855,
which excepts white persons from the recognition therein of
the unrestricted right of self-government by the Chickasaw
128. Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906).
129. Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906).
130. Morris v. Hitchcock, 21 App. D.C. 565 (1903), affi'med, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
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Nation and its full jurisdiction over persons and property
within its limits. 18 '
In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,8 2 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that the Oglala Sioux Tribe's privilege tax
against the lessee of a reservation Indian's property who used
the reservation property for grazing stock was properly imposed. 83
Although the power to tax does not necessarily depend upon
4
the power to remove and has been upheld in Buster v. Wright,"
when there was no power to remove a person, it may impose
conditions upon his remaining within tribal territory including the
conditions contained in certain taxes. Various tribal constitutions
approved under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 provide the
power to exclude persons not lawfully residing within the reserva18 5
tion.
Once an Indian tribe decides to undertake taxation, a large
number of questions present themselves for examination. Will taxation require tribal constitutional as well as statutory authorization?
Since the power to tax is inherent in an Indian tribe, constitutional
amendments are not necessary unless, of course, constitutional impediments to taxation presently exist. Several tribes have already
developed constitutional provisions authorizing taxation, pursuant
to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
Presumably, business activity will be the first object of Indian
taxation. Do tribes want to impose business taxes on Indian-owned
enterprises as well as on non-Indian-owned enterprises? Are there
possible constitutional impediments to taxing only non-Indians? If
the taxes will be imposed on businesses engaged in interstate commerce, are they fairly apportioned to reflect the portion of the
interstate business undertaken within the reservation? What tax
collection and enforcement provisions should be enacted? Does the
tribe have an appropriate judicial tribunal which could administer
the enforcement machinery? Should civil enforcement be limited
to the seizure of business related personal property? Will criminal
penalties against non-Indians raise certain constitutional problems
relating to the non-Indians' right to a jury trial by his peers?
Finally, the form of the business tax must be carefully considered. A business tax would be a tax for the privilege of doing business on the Indian reservation. Such a tax could be calculated
for example by reference to gross receipts attributable to the busi131.
132.
133.
134,
(1906).
135.

Id. at 593.
Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
Cf. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. 1955).
Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S.
F.
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ness activity occurring on the reservation or by reference to the
value of business property utilized on the reservation.
Yet another reason exists for the adoption of comprehensive
schedules for tribal taxation, consistent with the social and political
goals of the tribe. Under the Act of October 20, 1972,16 Indian
tribal governments and Alaska Native villages performing substantial governmental functions are entitled to participate in the sharing
of federal revenues under §108 (b) (4) of that Act. The tax effort
of local government is important in determining the allocation of
a particular county area under the Act (and therefore to individual
Indian tribes within the county area). It is important that the
tribe demonstrate a substantial tax effort. Where, for example,
tribal revenue for financial and governmental purposes is presently
realized from the "proprietary" return on tribal lands, the tribes
may wish to seek alternative ways of collecting that proprietary
return as tax revenue.

136.
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